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Abstract
A known drawback of ‘decentralised’ contact tracing architectures is
that users who have been in contact with an infected person are able
to precisely identify the relevant contact, and thereby perhaps identify
the infected person. In [1], the PACT team discuss a simple DH-based
protocol to mitigate this problem, but dismiss it because it is vulnerable
to a malicious user who may deviate from the specified behaviour. This
note presents a modified protocol which achieves robustness against a fully
malicious user, and establishes some simple security properties.
1 Introduction
In the design of contact tracing apps, the choice between ‘centralised’ and ‘de-
centralised’ architectures has received great public attention. The latter, which
has been adopted by the majority of countries, by the Google-Apple API and by
the DP3T consortium [5], has many privacy advantages, but one disadvantage
is that each individual user is able to determine which of the many tokens they
have collected came from an infected user, and consequently (by recalling the
precise time and strength of the contact), may be able to identify the infected
individual among their contacts [6]. This may compromise the privacy of the
infected person, and violates the principle of manual contact tracing that a per-
son should be told only that they have been in contact with an infected person,
and not the person’s identity [2].
One possible solution to this problem, discussed in [1], is for infected users
to send to the system the tokens they have collected rather than those they have
distributed. These can then be rerandomised before being broadcast to all users,
so that users are able to recognise a rerandomised token as being derived from
one they have broadcast, but not specifically which one. The simple protocol
described in [1] is as follows (working in a multiplicative group G of prime order
with generator g):
1. Each user u generates a keypair (su, g
su) with random su.
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2. Each broadcast token is of the form ti = (g
αi , gαisu), where each αi is
chosen uniformly at random.
3. On testing positive, a user who has received the token t = (x, y) uploads
(xβ , yβ) for fresh random β.
4. To determine whether they are at risk, user u checks whether a token of
the form (x, y) with y = xsu is present on the server.
Conditional on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption on G, the
tokens generated by each user are pseudorandom, and furthermore a user who
learns they are at risk cannot tell which of their tokens (generated using su)
was reported, because of the exponentiation by fresh random r. However, as the
authors note, this protocol is fatally flawed in the presence of malicious users.
Such a user can simply use a fresh su for every token they generate, and this
cannot be detected or prevented (one could imagine requiring every token to be
accompanied by a zero-knowledge proof that it was generated using one of the
keys in a public list of public keys, but this would not be remotely practical).
In this note we show how to modify the protocol so as to be robust against
fully malicious users, at the cost of requiring the server to send a ‘personalised’
(but non-secret) set of rerandomised tokens to each user. The essential idea
is to extend the rerandomisation step such that the messages corresponding to
malformed tokens are flat random.
2 Protocol description
We describe the protocol in three phases: registration; broadcasting, where a
user has contacts with others and transmits tokens; and infection, after the user
has tested positive. Throughout, G is assumed to be a multiplicative abelian
group of prime order p, with generator g.
- Registration phase: sample s← U([0, p−1]) and send gs (non-anonymously)
to the server, which adds it to the list of public keys.
Since registration is not required to be anonymous, the server can ensure that
each individual is only able to register a single key.
- Broadcast phase: sample α← U([1, p− 1]), and broadcast the token
Tok(s, α) := (gα, gsα),
replacing α with a fresh random value after a suitable period.
- Infection phase: a user who tests positive sends the server the list of tokens
it has received. The server verifies that each token t = (x, y) has x 6= g
(discarding those that fail). At the end of each day, for each user u, say
with public key gsu , for each token t = (x, y) in its list the server samples
β, γ ← U([0, p− 1]) and sends to u
Shuff((x, y), β, γ, gsu) := (xβgγ , yβ(gsu)γ).
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On receiving t′ = (z, w), user u checks whether w = zsu , and if so knows that
they are infected.
Note that ambiguity (but not other privacy properties) is dependent on
the honesty of the server; similarly, in manual contact tracing ambiguity is
dependent on the discretion of the tracer.
To establish correctness, observe that if t′ came from a token broadcast by
u, then we have
t′ = Shuff (Tok(s, α), β, γ, gsu)
=
(
(gα)βgγ , (gsuα)β(gsu)γ
)
=
(
gαβ+γ , gsu(αβ+γ)
)
,
as required (for some α, β, γ).
The communication cost of this protocol is equivalent to that of just sending
each user a list of all the tokens from infected users, with O(1) computational
cost per message passed from server to user (a single exponentiation by the user,
and four exponentiations by the server).
3 Security properties
In this section we establish three key security properties of the protocol. First,
conditional on the DDH assumption on G, the tokens broadcast by a user with
randomly chosen key are computationally indistinguishable from independent
random group elements, even with knowledge of the public key (Theorem 1),
and so no privacy is lost by uninfected users. Second, for each user u the output
of Shuff (as a probability distribution on G×G with random β, γ) is equal on all
tokens honestly generated by u (Theorem 2), and so an honest-but-curious u will
be unable to determine which of their broadcast tokens corresponded to contact
with an infected person. Third, for any u the output of Shuff on any input other
than a token honestly generated by u is uniformly random (Theorem 3), and
so a malicious user is not able to defeat ambiguity by broadcasting malformed
tokens.
Theorem 1. Let k be a positive integer, and (S,A1, . . . , Ak) ∼ U([0, p − 1] ×
[0, p− 1]k). If G satisfies the DDH assumption then
(gS ,Tok(S,A1), . . . ,Tok(S,Ak))
c≡ U(G × (G × G)k).
Proof. Let A be a PPT algorithm distinguishing the two distributions, and let
(g1, g2, g3) be a DDH challenge (so either (g1, g2, g3) = (g
x, gy, gxy) or (gx, gy, gz)
for random x, y, z). RunA on (g1, (gs12 , gs13 ), (gs22 , gs23 ), . . . , (gsk2 , gsk3 )) for random
s1, s2, . . . , sk ∈ [0, p− 1].
Theorem 2. Let (X,Y ) ∼ U([0, p − 1]2) and Z ∼ U(G). Then for all s ∈
[0, p− 1], α ∈ [1, p− 1], we have
Shuff (Tok(s, α), X, Y, gs) ≡ (Z,Zs).
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Proof. We have Shuff(Tok(s, α), β, γ, gs) = (gαβ+γ , (gαβ+γ)s). Since γ is uni-
formly distributed, so is αβ + γ and hence so is gαβ+γ , as required.
Theorem 3. Let (X,Y ) ∼ U([0, p − 1]2). Then for all s ∈ [0, p − 1], t ∈
(G \ {e})× G, either t = Tok(s, α) for some α ∈ [1, p− 1] or we have
Shuff (t,X, Y, gs) ≡ U(G × G).
Proof. Without loss of generality t = (gα, gs
′α) for some s′ and α 6= 0. If
t 6= Tok(s, α) then s′ 6= s. Then
Shuff(t, β, γ, gs) =
(
(gα)βgγ , (gs
′α)β(gs)γ
)
=
(
gαβ+γ , gs
′αβ+sγ
)
=
(
gαβ+γ , gs
′(αβ+γ)+(s−s′)γ
)
.
Since α 6= 0 and β, γ are independently uniformly distributed (IUD), we have
that αβ and γ are IUD, and hence so are αβ + γ and γ. Hence since s− s′ 6= 0
we have that αβ+ γ and s′(αβ+ γ) + (s− s′)γ are IUD and hence so are gαβ+γ
and gs
′(αβ+γ)+(s−s′)γ , as required.
4 Discussion
Related work
The other approach for achieving ambiguity of which the author is aware is to
use a Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) protocol to allow users to
determine whether the set of tokens they have collected intersects with the set
of tokens held by the server from infected users, without learning which tokens
are in the intersection. This was proposed independently in [4] and in [3]. The
security analysis in [4] is expressly limited to the semi-honest setting, although
it is suggested that one could guard against a dishonest user by requiring them
to provide zero-knowledge proofs of correct behaviour, no doubt with significant
performance consequences.
The protocol in [3] is similarly clearly flawed in the presence of a fully mali-
cious user (specifically, at step 2 of the protocol, Alice may use different values
of α for different xi and thereby reidentify elements despite Bob’s permuta-
tion). Moreover, no proofs are provided for the claimed security properties, and
it seems that even in the semi-honest setting the claim that the server obtains
no information about the contacts of undiagnosed users may be incorrect (for
example, if the authorities can send to a suspect two tokens x and x′ such that
x′ = x2 then they will be able to identify the suspect as Alice when she performs
the protocol).
4
Open questions
The trick for this protocol was to ensure correct behaviour not by cumbersome
zero-knowledge proofs but by rerandomising in such a way that a malformed
token just results in the malefactor seeing random noise. The most important
question for future work is whether a similar trick can be applied to obtain
a lightweight DH-based protocol for PSI-CA which is robust against a fully
malicious adversary. This would be extremely desirable because it could easily
be added to DP3T-style systems with no changes to the system structure or to
the technically-constrained Bluetooth Low Energy tokens.
A second question is whether it is possible for the server, rather than sending
all the rerandomised tokens to each user, to instead combine them in some way
such that the user can tell whether they included at least one of the special form
(x, xsu). This would be desirable for both performance and privacy reasons,
since it would prevent users from learning how many of the tokens sent in by
infected individuals were theirs. If the question was whether they were all of
the special form then this would be trivial: just multiply together all the tokens
componentwise. Unfortunately we have been unable to find a similar solution
for the ‘disjunctive’ task.
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